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How American Workers Lost the Right to
Strike, and Other Tales
James Gray Pope
Abstract
This essay recounts the origins of five statements of labor law made by the Supreme
Court, each of which has had a devastating impact on the American labor move-
ment. The five statements are: (1) Workers have no right of self-defense against
employers that commit unfair labor practices (NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corporation); (2) Employers enjoy the right permanently to replace economic
strikers (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company); (3) The National La-
bor Relations Board has no power to deter unfair labor practices (Consolidated
Edison Company v. NLRB); (4) Employers may exclude union organizers from
their property (Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB); (5) Employers may close operations
out of “spite” against workers who choose to unionize (Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Manufacturing Co.). The essay argues that in each of the five cases,
the Court revived Lochner-era constitutional doctrines – supposedly defunct since
the “switch in time that saved nine” in 1937 – and applied them to cut back on
statutory labor rights. Although the five statements were not considered espe-
cially dangerous at the time, their impact has since been magnified by social and
economic change. Taken together, they may account for a substantial proportion
of the decline in the American labor movement. As in the pre-New Deal pe-
riod, then, judges have deprived workers of the rights to organize and strike based
on constitutional concerns. This time, however, they have avoided the forthright
constitutional reasoning of the pre-1937 period, thereby insulating their rulings
against changes in constitutional jurisprudence.
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How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales
James Gray Pope
To paraphrase a veteran labor scholar, if you want to know where the corpses are buried
in labor law, look for the “of course” statements in court opinions.    By “of course” statements,1
he meant propositions that are announced as if they were self-evident, requiring no justification. 
Each year, thousands of law students read such statements in labor law casebooks.  And each
year, they duly ask themselves – prodded sometimes by the casebook’s notes – how these
conclusions could be justified in legal terms.  But there seems to be no answer, and the mystery
continues.
This essay goes back to the historical record and recounts the origins of five such “of
course” statements, each of which has had a devastating impact on the American labor
movement.  The five statements are:
(1)  Of course, workers have no right of self-defense against employers that commit
unfair labor practices.2
(2)  Of course, employers enjoy the right to permanently replace economic strikers.3
(3)  Of course, the National Labor Relations Board has no power to deter unfair labor
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practices.4
(4)  Of course, employers may exclude union organizers from their property.5
(5)  Of course, employers may close operations out of “spite” against workers who choose
to unionize.6
 These statements all share one puzzling feature.  In the accepted hierarchy of laws, only
the United States Constitution can trump federal statutes.   Yet, each of these statements elevates7
the state common-law rights of employers over the federal statutory rights of workers.   In itself,8
this only deepens the mystery.  But it also gives rise to an hypothesis.  If the Constitution is the
only source of law with sufficient authority to provide a legal justification for these statements,
then maybe they can be traced to constitutional thinking.  To give credit where credit is due, this
is not my idea; it builds on an observation by then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist:  
From its earliest cases construing the National Labor Relations Act the Court has
recognized the weight of an employer’s property rights, rights which are explicitly
protected from federal interference by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Court has not been quick to conclude in a given instance that Congress has
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art3
  NLRB v. Eastex, Inc., 437 U.S. 556, 580 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).9
  306 U.S. 240 (1939).10
  Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 942.11
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authorized the displacement of those rights by the federally created rights of the
employee.9
In support of this claim, Justice Rehnquist cited NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corporation,  the source of our first “of course” statement.  But he left the other cases10
unspecified.  The five stories that follow (Parts I-V) confirm the accuracy of the Rehnquist thesis
as applied to Fansteel, and suggest that – if we include liberty of contract and the commerce
clause along with property rights – it explains the other four “of course” statements as well.   In
each of the five cases, the Court revived Lochner-era doctrines – supposedly defunct since the
“switch in time that saved nine” in 1937 – and applied them to cut back on statutory labor rights. 
Once again, judges have deprived workers of the rights to organize and strike, but this time
without the forthright constitutional reasoning of the pre-1937 period. 
How did this happen?  Why did the Court hide the constitutional ball in “of course”
statements?  What are the implications for labor law today?  Part VI concludes the essay by
addressing those questions.
I.  How American Workers Lost the Right of Self-Defense
On February 17, 1937, members of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee at the
Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation occupied two buildings of the factory and commenced a sit-
down strike.  That same day, management told the strikers that they were fired.    After a court11
enjoined the strikers to cease their occupation, a force of 140 police officers armed with tear gas
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guns and baseball bats assaulted the plant only to be repulsed by strikers hurling nuts, bolts, and
other objects.  A second attempt, conducted before dawn with a larger force, succeeded.  During
both attacks windows were broken and other company property damaged.  After their eviction
from the plant, a majority of the strikers were convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to
fines and substantial jail terms.12
 The strikers claimed that they had rightfully occupied the factories in self-defense of
their right to organize, protected under the recently enacted National Labor Relations Act.   Prior13
to the sit-down, the corporation had committed a variety of unfair labor practices over a period of
six months, including planting a spy in the local union, transferring the local’s president to an
isolated location, establishing a company-dominated union, and announcing that management
would never bargain with the union under any circumstances.    The workers had filed charges14
with the National Labor Relations Board, but five months had gone by with no action.   “The15
members of the lodge felt,” recalled one union leader, “that we were letting the company push us
around, and we were not sticking up for their rights as they considered them under the Wagner
labor law. . . ; they demanded  we do something.”    Meanwhile, Fansteel’s spy within the union16
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  Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. at 939; Fansteel Record, supra note 15, at17
389, 394-95; Hart & Pritchard, supra note 16, at 1280-81.  At the time of the Fansteel strike, the
Board had already developed the rule that workers who struck in protest of unfair labor practices
could not be permanently replaced.  Jefferey-DeWitt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936),
enforced, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937); Carlisle Lumber Co., 2
N.L.R.B. 248 (1936), enf’d as modified, 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575
(1938).  But relying on this rule would do nothing to protect the workers or their union during the
period that unfair labor practice charges were pending – a period that, judging from the five-
month delay that had already ensued since the union filed its charges, would be a long one.
   The Board reasoned that reinstatement was necessary to restore the status quo18
prevailing prior to the employer’s violations.  Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. at 944-
45.
  306 U.S. at 252-53, 255. 19
5
was acting as an agent provocateur, urging the workers to go out on a traditional strike – thus
giving the company an opportunity to break the union by bringing in striker replacements.   17
Caught between the necessity for action and the perils of a traditional strike, the unionists
resorted to the sit-down.
The National Labor Relations Board bypassed the workers’ claim of self-defense by
ordering Fansteel to reinstate the strikers as a remedy for the company’s pre-strike unfair labor
practices.    The Supreme Court, on the other hand, squarely confronted the issue.  In an opinion18
by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Board could not reinstate sit-downers even
though their strike would not have occurred but for the employer’s violations of law.   According
to the Chief Justice, the strikers lost their status as statutory “employees” when Fansteel
discharged them.  And since the NLRB was empowered to reinstate only “employees,” it could
not reinstate the fired strikers.   Why was it legal for Fansteel to terminate employees for19
responding with self-help to its own statutory violations?  The opinion made it clear that the
employer’s common-law property rights were of a different and higher order than the employees’
statutory labor rights.  While the company’s repeated violations of the workers’ right to organize
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  Id. at 256 (emphasis added).21
  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).22
  306 U.S. at 252.23
  Id. at 255.  Justice Stone’s concurrence took a similar approach, observing that if the24
Act had expressed an intention to bar employers from discharging workers for “unlawful
practices,” he “should have thought it of sufficiently dubious constitutionality to require us to
construe its language otherwise, if that could reasonably be done . . . .”  Id. at 265 (Stone, J.,
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did not deprive it of  “its legal rights to the possession and protection of its property,” the
workers’ violation of the employer’s property rights put them “outside the protection of the
statute.”   At no point in his opinion for the majority did Chief Justice Hughes mention the20
impact of the employer’s unfair labor practices on the workers’ statutory rights.  In fact, the Court
was so little concerned about the corporation’s violations that it referred to the sit-down as “an
illegal seizure of the buildings in order to prevent their use by the employer in a lawful
manner.”   21
How did the corporation’s common law property rights rise so far above the workers’
statutory rights?  Constitutional law operated both to pump up the former and to deflate the latter. 
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, the Court had upheld the Board’s power to reinstate a worker fired
for union activity, but only because the Act allowed the employer to fire a worker for any other
reason, and thus did “not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select
its employees or to discharge them.”    In Fansteel, Chief Justice Hughes characterized the issue22
as whether the Act abrogated the employer’s right to fire workers who had illegally seized its
property – certainly a “normal” exercise of the right to discharge.   “Apart from the question of23
the constitutional validity of an enactment of that sort,” he wrote, “it is enough to say that such a
legislative intention should be found in some definite and unmistakable expression.”    The24
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concurring).
  Brief for Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,25
306 U.S. 240 (1938) (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down federal
statutory prohibition on yellow dog contracts, partly on 5th amendment due process grounds) and
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state statutory prohibition on yellow dog
contracts as a violation of the due process clause of the 14th amendment).
  301 U.S. at 30-31, citing NLRA sec. 10(a), 29 U.S.C. sec. 160(a).26
  See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 83 L. Ed. 126, 132 (1938) (Lawyers’ Edition27
summary of Fahy’s argument).
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Chief Justice did not cite any authority for the existence of a constitutional right to discharge
workers, a gap that was filled in Fansteel’s brief with citations to the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment and to the Lochner-era cases of Adair v. United States and Coppage v.
Kansas.25
While the employer’s right to fire workers rose to the constitutional level, the workers’
statutory right to organize all but disappeared from consideration.  This too had its roots in
constitutional thinking, here grounded on the commerce clause.  In Jones & Laughlin, the Court
had held that a Board order could survive constitutional challenge only if the particular unfair
labor practices at issue actually affected interstate commerce, and thus fell within Congress’
commerce power.    NLRB General Counsel Charles Fahy interpreted this to mean that the reach26
of the Act to a particular enterprise hinged on whether “stoppage of ... operations by industrial
strife” in that enterprise would substantially interrupt or interfere with interstate commerce.   In27
its anxiousness to win this point, the Board focused solely on the commerce-protecting purpose
of the Act, which tended to cast unions and strikers as dangerous disruptors of commerce. 
Forgotten were other statutory policies that might have offered stronger support for the Board’s
orders – policies like “restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees,” “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining,” and “protecting
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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8
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of
representatives of their own choosing.”    28
The Court went a step farther.  Not only did the Justices follow the Board in skipping
over these policies and focusing solely on protecting commerce, but they also substituted their
own judgment for that of Congress as to how commerce would best be protected.   Section 1 of
the Act declared that it was “the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing.”  The causes to be eliminated were the “denial by employers of the right of employees
to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining.”    In29
this light, it seems clear that – whatever else they were doing – the Fansteel strikers were serving
the primary purpose of the Act by enforcing its guarantee of the right to organize and thereby
helping to “eliminate the causes” of strikes.  The NLRB had failed to take action on their unfair
labor practice charge, filed five months before the sit-down, and their union was threatened with
destruction due to the employer’s violations.  An outside strike would have exposed the workers
to replacement, a danger underscored by the fact that the company’s spy in the union was urging
that course of action.30
To the Court, however, the need for a prompt remedy did not register in the balance. 
Chief Justice Hughes declined to consider whether the workers’ mode of enforcement was
necessary or effective, only whether it was peaceful.  Since the sit-down strike involved “force
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art3
  306 U.S. at 257-58.31
  Hart & Pritchard, supra note 16, at 1321-22.32
  Letter from Andrew Furuseth, President, International Seamen's Union, to Senator33
Robert F. Wagner (Apr. 16, 1935), in Robert F. Wagner Papers, Labor Series, box 4, folder 39,
Georgetown Univ. Special Collections; James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment versus the
Commerce Clause: 1921-1950: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-
1957, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14, 54-55 (2002) (reporting the American Federation of Labor’s
proposal to ground the bill on the Republican Government clause of article IV, and others’
advocacy of the fourteenth amendment).
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and violence in defiance of the law of the land,” it clearly did not promote industrial peace.   The31
procedures of the Act, on the other hand, were “peaceful.”  The Court did not pause to consider
whether the Board’s peaceful processes could, as a practical matter, remedy the employer’s
destruction of the union’s majority support.  Thus, the statutory strategy of eliminating the causes
of disruptions to commerce fell out of the equation.    32
The Court’s lack of concern for the workers’ statutory rights cannot be blamed entirely on
Chief Justice Hughes or the Fansteel majority.  The statute itself reduced the workers’ rights to
the status of mere means to the end of preventing disruptions to commerce.  This was the result
of a conscious choice by the bill’s creator, Senator Robert Wagner of New York.  Labor leaders
and others had urged the Senator to ground his bill not on Congress’ commerce power, but on its
human rights powers.  To Andrew Furuseth, the labor movement’s leading constitutional thinker,
the bill exemplified the “Christian principle of evolution from slavery to freedom,” which
belonged under the thirteenth amendment, not the commerce clause.   Philosophically, Senator33
Wagner took a similar view of his bill.  Along with other proponents of the NLRA, he likened
the non-union workplace to feudalism and slavery, and promised that government enforcement of
the right to organize would bestow upon workers “emancipation from economic slavery and . . .
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  79 Cong. Rec. 6184 (1935) (address by Senator Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB,34
Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 2284 (1949) (hereafter Legislative
History); see also Hearings on S. 2926, at 467-68, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra this
note, at 501-02 (quoting Senator Wagner’s insistence that “all [the bill] does is to make the
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an opportunity to walk the streets free men in fact as well as in name.”   34
Constitutionally, however, Senator Wagner adhered to the commerce power, apparently
in the belief that it was more acceptable to middle class reformers and judges.   As a result, each35
exercise of the NLRB’s authority had to be justified not in terms of labor freedom, but as an
effort to prevent disruptions to commerce.  During the early, formative period of NLRA
jurisprudence, this constitutional requirement exerted a strong influence.  Even the Board’s own
lawyers defended the Act as an exercise of Congress’ power to “control” and “punish” strikes.   36
In its Fansteel opinion, as we have seen, the Board focused solely on the protection of
commerce, failing even to mention the express statutory policies in favor of equal bargaining
power, freedom of association, or collective bargaining.  In hindsight, it seems inevitable that
courts would be tempted to bypass those policies and directly discourage workers from striking,
thereby protecting commerce.  
Senator Wagner foresaw this possibility and inserted language to prevent it.  Section 13
provided that “[n]othing in this [Act] ... shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike."    The Senator explained that the Act was dedsigned37
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  Hearings on National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Before the S.38
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 76th Cong. 17 (1939) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner)
(quoted in The Wagner Act: After Ten Years 31 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945)).
  306 U.S. at 256.39
  78 Cong. Rec. 12044 (1934), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 34, at40
1241.
  H.E. Fleming, In the Wake of a Sit-down Strike, 46 Chemical and Metallurgical41
Engineering 624, 625 (October 1939).
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“to reduce the number of strikes by eliminating the main wrongs and injustices that cause
strikes.”  Accordingly, the “imposition of legal restrictions upon the right to strike, instead of
removing these wrongs, would merely deprive the worker of his inalienable right to protest
against them.”38
But Fansteel demonstrated the inadequacy of section 13 as a control on judges.  Chief
Justice Hughes easily dismissed the strikers’ section 13 argument on the ground that “the right to
strike” encompassed only “the unquestioned right to quit work.”   Senator Wagner’s broader39
view of section 13 (“I would not buy peace,” he said, “at the price of slavery” ) dropped out. 40
The Court did not even consider the price of peace in Fansteel.  And the peace that followed its
decision was one of unbridled employer domination.  By barring the Board from reinstating the
strikers, the Court left Fansteel with a workforce composed of striker replacements and workers
who had crossed the union’s picket lines.  This workforce rejected the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee and voted to be represented by an in-house union, which Fansteel promptly
recognized as the exclusive representative for all its production employees.    This “union”41
negotiated a grievance procedure culminating in a final decision not by an impartial arbitrator,
but by Fansteel’s President, R.J. Aitchison.  In April of 1939, Aitchison looked back with
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satisfaction on the course of events.  Relations with the employees were “closer than ever before”
– so close that not a single grievance had been filed under the new procedure.  “You could either
be embittered or liberalized by an experience like ours,” he observed.  “I think I have been
liberalized.”  In what did this liberalization consist?  Not in any regret for the company’s unfair
labor practices, but in “explaining more to the employees and in giving more attention to
employee relations.”42
Not only did Aitchison enjoy the new docility of his workforce, but he also received a raft
of “fan mail” from other employers congratulating the company on its historic victory.   Just43
how historic became increasingly apparent over time.  The courts and – eventually – the NLRB
read Fansteel broadly to authorize the discharge of workers for engaging in slow-downs and
other partial strike activities.   More recently, the Supreme Court relied on Fansteel to support44
its decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, denying backpay to undocumented aliens
who had been fired for joining a labor union.   As in Fansteel, both the workers and the45
company had violated the law.  And as in Fansteel, the Court held that the workers’ violations
deprived them of their remedy for the employer’s violations.  Thus, the workers suffered not only
the legal penalties for their lawbreaking – imprisonment and fines in Fansteel, deportation in
Hoffman – but also the disruption of their unions and the loss of jobs and pay.  By contrast, the
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  Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic46
Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal
Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L.Rev. 1, 4 (2003); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers’ Rights in
a Post-Hoffman World – Organizing around the Thirteenth Amendment, __ [Ed.: a full citation
for this forthcoming article should be available by the time we go to press.]
  304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).47
   NLRA secs. 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. secs. 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3); see Eileen48
Silverstein, If you can't beat 'em, learn to lose, but never join them, 30 U. Conn. L. Rev. 1371,
1373 (1998) ( “As an exercise in statutory interpretation, even the most conservative students
have wondered at a result that honors, on the one hand, the prohibition against discharging
employees because they strike, but allows, on the other hand, replacement of strikers and
retention of strikebreakers once the dispute has ended”).
13
employers in both cases enjoyed the benefits of their lawbreaking unimpeded by any sanction
other than an order to post notices promising to refrain from future violations – notices that might
as well have bragged: “Look what we got away with.”  As Professors Cameron and Ontiveros
have pointed out, Hoffman effectively stripped undocumented aliens of legal recourse, thus
creating “an underclass of low-wage Latino immigrants” available for exploitation.46
II.  How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike
In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company, the Supreme Court laid down a dictum
that has puzzled legal scholars and vexed unions increasingly over the years.  According to this
dictum, an employer enjoys the right permanently to replace workers who strike for better wages
and conditions.    The dictum is puzzling because the strike is one of those “concerted activities”47
protected under section 7, and employers are prohibited from discharging or otherwise interfering
with, restraining, coercing or discriminating against employees for exercising section 7 rights.   48
Yet, the Mackay Court simply asserted the employer right, offering no explanation why strikers –
who are admittedly protected against “discharge” – can nevertheless be replaced permanently at
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the discretion of the employer.   
The employer’s right to hire permanent replacements operates as an unqualified trump
over the section 7 right to strike for better conditions and higher wages.  The employer need not
show any business reason for its exercise (for example, that unless replacements are offered
permanent employment the company will be unable to continue operating), and the rule leaves no
room for the Board to argue that the impact of permanent replacement on the section 7 right
outweighs the employer’s interest.    Theoretically, an employer violates the Act if it replaces49
strikers for reasons of anti-union animus.  But because animus is virtually impossible to prove
(unless the employer is clumsy enough to reveal it in public), the law does nothing to prevent an
employer from seizing on the strike as an opportunity to replace union with nonunion workers.   50
In effect, when workers go out on strike, they give the employer a license to discriminate; the
employer need only limit itself (1) to “permanently replacing” union workers as opposed to
“discharging” them, and (2) to discriminating only between strikebreakers and strikers as
opposed to discriminating among loyal strikers (as on the facts of Mackay, where the employer
targeted active unionists for replacement) or among strikebreakers.
The result is a bizarre reversal of the strike’s traditional function.  While the strike is
legally protected so that it can provide workers with a source of bargaining power, it now serves
as a source of employer bargaining power.  According to a recent study of collective bargaining
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  Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev.52
1527, 1538 (2002) (hereafter Estlund, Ossification) (citing Charles B. Craver, Can Unions
Survive? 29, 132-34, 143-46 (1993); Julius Getman, The Betrayal of Local 14 224-28 (1998);
William B. Gould IV, Agenda for Reform 185-88, 202-03 (1993); Paul C. Weiler, Governing
the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law 264-69(1990); Michael H.
Gottesman, Union Summer: A Reawakened Interest in the Law of Labor?, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev.
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negotiations, employers are now more likely to threaten permanent replacement than unions are
to threaten a strike.    As Professor Estlund recently put it, the Mackay dictum has “rendered the51
strike useless and virtually suicidal for many employees, and has become employers’ Exhibit
Number One in union organizing campaigns.”    As employers have turned increasingly to52
permanent replacements, the incidence of strikes has dropped sharply.   That the labor53
movement considers the Mackay dictum to be a serious problem is evidenced by the fact that
eight years ago, at a time when the Presidency and both houses of Congress were held by
Democrats, the AFL-CIO launched an intense campaign for legislation to overturn it – only to
see the bill succumb twice to Senate filibusters.54
The Mackay Court cited no source and offered no reasoning to support the existence of an
employer right permanently to replace strikers.   The statutory language, which makes it an55
unfair labor practice for the employer to engage in “discrimination” based on union activity or to
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  NLRA secs. 8(a)(3), 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. secs. 158(a)(3), 158(a)(1).56
  See Atleson, supra note 1, at 24-25; Gorman, supra note 49, at 329.  Employers57
sometimes argue that there are no positions for the returning strikers because the replacements
are in current possession.  However, the strikers were in possession prior to the strike, and
section 2(3) of the Act specifies that “any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who
has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment” remains an
“employee.”  NLRA sec. 2(3), 29 U.S.C. sec. 152(3).
  NLRA, sec. 13, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) .58
  See Getman, Pogrebin & Gregory, supra note 49, at 164; Gorman, supra note 49, at59
329.
16
“coerce” employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights, appears to negate any such right.   56
An employer that retains nonstriking workers at the end of a strike while denying returning
strikers their jobs is certainly discriminating – in the ordinary meaning of the word – based on
union activity.    Workers who cross picket lines are rewarded with permanent jobs, while57
workers who exercise their statutory right to strike are punished with the loss of their jobs.  And
there are few more potent forms of “coercion” than forcing individual workers to choose between
protected activity and losing their jobs to permanent replacements.  Whether the loss of a job
comes as a result of a discharge (concededly illegal) or of “permanent replacement,” it certainly
constitutes a powerful disincentive to engage in protected activity.  Furthermore, at the time of
Mackay, section 13 of the Act barred courts not only from construing the Act to impose direct
legal restraints on the right to strike, but also from reading it to “interfere with or impede or
diminish” the right “in any way.”58
Commentators have tried to fit the Mackay dictum into the structure of current law by
asserting that it rests on the assumption that employers have a legitimate business need to offer
prospective replacements permanent employment in order to operate during strikes.   But the59
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Court never made any such determination, and there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the
Justices were thinking along those lines.  If they were, then they were simply wrong on the facts.
Employers routinely succeed in obtaining striker replacements without offering permanent
employment, and there is no evidence that they need to make such offers.    Moreover, the60
Mackay dictum would not fit into the structure of current law even if employers could show that
they were motivated by a desire to attract replacement workers.  Under the current standard,
which outlaws employer countermeasures that are “inherently destructive” of section 7 rights
even if the employer acted out of legitimate business reasons, the hiring of permanent
replacement workers would seem to be inherently destructive just as discharge is inherently
destructive.   In short, the Mackay dictum cannot be explained or rationalized with reference to61
the employer’s need to hire striker replacements.
Looking at the paper trail leading up to the dictum, we find that the issue was treated not
as a question of the employer’s business necessity, but as a matter of constitutional law.  As in
Fansteel, the employer claimed constitutional protection for its freedom to terminate strikers, and
argued that termination would promote the statute’s constitutional purpose of preventing
disruptions to interstate commerce.   The Mackay Company’s lawyers contended that a Board
order reinstating economic strikers would deprive the employer of its property and liberty
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.   As long as the employer had not provoked the strike by
unfair labor practices, its “normal” right to select its employees remained “invulnerable.”  And,
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although strikers technically remained employees, they had no current contractual relation with
their employer.  Thus, concluded Mackay’s lawyers, a Board order reinstating strikers would, in
effect, force the employer to enter into a new contract with the strikers – a clear violation of the
Fifth Amendment.    In addition, the company’s lawyers argued that strikers should be faced62
with the possibility of losing their jobs permanently, because that threat would discourage them
from striking, thus promoting the statutory policy of preventing disruptions to interstate
commerce.   The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit twice ruled for the employer, with63
Judge Curtis D. Wilbur writing two lead opinions adopting Mackay’s Fifth Amendment theory –
one before Jones & Laughlin and one afterward, on rehearing.   64
While Mackay’s lawyers and Judge Wilbur elevated the employer’s rights to the
constitutional level, the NLRB subsumed the workers’ rights into the Act’s constitutional
purpose of preventing disruptions to interstate commerce.  Employer interference with union
activity tended to provoke strikes, reasoned the Board, and strikes injured commerce – as
illustrated by the Mackay strike itself, which drastically reduced the company’s communications
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traffic and resulted in considerable loss of business.   This argument fit right in with the65
constitutional theory that had led the Supreme Court to uphold the Board orders involved in
Jones & Laughlin and its companion cases, but it also portrayed the strikers’ legally protected
activity as a kind of economic vandalism.  It dovetailed with the employer’s argument that to
grant the Board power to reinstate strikers “would thwart rather than accomplish” the Act’s
purposes because, “[b]y guaranteeing a striker his job, . . . peaceful negotiation would be
discouraged and strikes would be encouraged.”   The Board made no mention of the statutory66
policies in favor of equal bargaining power or full freedom of association.  Nor did it make any
mention of section 13, which had been inserted into the Act precisely to ensure that the right to
strike would not be suppressed as a means of obtaining industrial peace.   67
As to the specific issue of permanent replacement, the Board based its original finding of
a violation not on the company’s refusal to reinstate economic strikers per se, but on its
discrimination among returning strikers in selecting who would fill the positions that were
available at the end of the strike.   The opinion explained that the employer had illegally refused
to reinstate union officers and activists while, at the same time, reinstating less-active strikers. 
The Board declined to address the broader question of the employer’s right to retain replacement
workers in preference to economic strikers because “a decision on the point is not necessary to
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the final judgment.”    But in the Supreme Court, the Board’s General Counsel, Charles Fahy,68
conceded that an employer could replace strikers and then, at the conclusion of the strike, retain
the replacements and refuse to reinstate the would-be returning strikers.    69
Scholars have wondered why Fahy made this apparently gratuitous concession.  From a
constitutional perspective, however, it does not appear gratuitous.  Throughout the litigation,
Mackay’s lawyers and the Court of Appeals majority had insisted that the Board was seeking a
general power to reinstate economic strikers at the end of the strike.  In the Court of Appeals’
first decision, Judge Wilbur’s lead opinion went so far as to claim that the Board had relied
“solely” on the broad contention that it was unlawful for the employer to refuse to reinstate
economic strikers.    From the Board’s point of view, this was nothing more than an obfuscation;70
the Board had claimed only the limited power to remedy discrimination among the strikers.  But
from the point of view of the employer and the Court of Appeals majority, whose approach to the
case centered on preserving the employer’s “normal” Fifth Amendment right to select its
employees, this was a distinction without a difference.  Either way, the employer would be forced
to make new contracts with strikers who had – voluntarily and unprovoked by any employer
unfair labor practices – terminated their previous contractual relations by going on strike.   71
At first, Fahy responded to this problem by trying to clarify the Board’s position. In June
1937, he urged his regional lawyers to explain on rehearing that the Board’s order hinged not on
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discrimination against strikers generally, but on discrimination for union membership and
leadership among the returning strikers.    At this point, there was no talk of any concession;72
Fahy continued to follow the Board’s original approach of distinguishing – without conceding –
the permanent replacement issue.   But the Court of Appeals again conflated the issues and
accepted Mackay’s economic due process argument.    Fahy responded by attempting once more73
to explain without making any concession, this time in the Board’s initial brief to the Supreme
Court.    But Mackay’s lawyers ignored this explanation and insisted yet again that the Board74
was claiming a general power to reinstate economic strikers in preference to replacement workers
– a power “so obnoxious to the basic principles of our Bill of Rights that it cannot stand.”   It75
was at this point, in the Board’s reply brief, that Fahy made his fateful concession as part of a
seven-page discourse explaining, from every possible angle, that the company’s argument rested
on a “gross misstatement of the Board’s position.”76
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  Fahy’s own explanation does not provide significant evidence for or against the77
account given here.  Fahy tried to persuade the Court that the Board had already decided, prior to
the Mackay reply brief, that the employer enjoyed a right to hire permanent replacements.  NLRB
Reply Brief, supra note 69, at 16.  In support of this claim, the brief cited three decisions: 
Jefferey-DeWitt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936), enforced, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937); Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936), enf’d as
modified, 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938); and Black Diamond
Steamship Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. 84 (1937), enf’d, 94 F.2d 875, cert. denied, 304 U.S. 579 (1938). 
In each of these cases, the Board reinstated unfair labor practice strikers using language implying
that the employer’s provocation or prolongation of the strike by unfair labor practices was
important to the outcome.  See Jefferey-DeWitt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. at 626-27; Carlisle
Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. at 277; Black Diamond Steamship Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. at 93.  However, it
does not appear that the issue of the rights of economic strikers was raised in any of these cases. 
By contrast, the issue was noted, distinguished, and expressly left open in the Board’s Mackay
opinion.  1 N.L.R.B. at 216.
22
Of course, we can never know for certain the reason for Fahy’s decision.   Nevertheless,77
the available evidence suggests that he was attempting to accomplish by concession what the
NLRB lawyers had repeatedly failed to accomplish by explanation – namely, assuaging fears that
a holding for the Board in Mackay would effectively empower it to compel employers to rehire
all economic strikers.  This fear had already led to two Court of Appeals decisions applying the
Fifth Amendment to negate any Board power to reinstate strikers, whether or not there had been
discrimination among the strikers.  But if the Board could not convince skeptics of its narrow
intentions, it could outright negate any possible fears as to the broad issue by conceding that
issue in no uncertain terms.  To pay for this negation, the Board would give up only the dubious
privilege of trying to defend a general Board power to reinstate strikers against constitutional
challenges.   Evidence that this would be a difficult task came not only from conservative judicial
activists like Judge Wilbur, but also from proponents of deference like Augustus and Learned
Hand.  Two months before Fahy made his concession, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals that included the Hands upheld a Board order reinstating unfair labor practice strikers
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against due process attack on grounds that implied economic strikers would not have prevailed. 
“[N]o more is done,” reasoned the Court, “than to maintain the status quo which existed on
December 14, 1936, as against unfair labor practices which occurred thereafter.”   The panel’s78
use of this rationale implied that if the strike had not been triggered by the employer’s unfair
labor practices, the employer would have continued to enjoy its constitutional right to select its
employees.   In short, it seems likely that Fahy traded the permanent replacement issue for a
favorable holding on the constitutional objection to the reinstatement order in Mackay.
At first, the Mackay dictum had little impact on the ground.  Strikers used mass picket
lines to block even temporary replacements.  Employers called on police to open the lines, but
unions insisted that police action against “peaceful” mass picket lines amounted to partisan
intervention in violation of the right to strike.  During the great post-war strike wave of 1946-47,
the big industrial unions of the CIO called mass demonstrations and mobilized political pressure
to keep the police “neutral” in labor disputes.  In Rochester New York, Lancaster Pennsylvania,
Stamford Connecticut and Oakland California, workers staged city-wide general strikes to protest
police attacks on mass picket lines.    Most unionized employers soon gave up the idea of trying79
to operate with replacement workers.  While the official law continued to grant employers the
right to operate during strikes, an unofficial norm barred them from doing so.  Writing in 1956,
Jack Barbash described the “prevailing situation” in the United States:  “[T]he employer . . .
makes no attempt to operate the plant during the strike and the picket line becomes only the
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symbolic expression of the strike.”   80
By the early 1960s, however, a new generation of managers had begun to replace those
who had experienced the mass picket lines of the 1940s.  Meanwhile, labor leaders had come to
rely less on solidarity and strike action than on government processes and employer goodwill. 
When the new managers challenged the old norm, they were pleasantly surprised to discover that
labor’s tradition of solidarity had atrophied to the point that many workers were happy to cross
picket lines.  By the mid-1980s, the Mackay rule had become fully effective on the ground, and
striking was no longer a viable option for most workers.81
III.  How the National Labor Relations Board Lost Its Teeth
The Supreme Court has ruled that the NLRB cannot act to deter unfair labor practices, but
must limit itself to remedying harms inflicted by parties before the Board.   As a result,82
employers have little incentive to comply with the law.  From a cost-benefit point of view, it is
often profitable to fire union advocates.  If the employer can avoid even a modest wage increase,
the savings are likely to exceed many times over the costs of any back pay awards that the Board
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might eventually assess.    It is not surprising, then, that employers fire or otherwise retaliate83
against 1 out of every 18 private-sector workers who support a union organizing campaign.    In84
the late 1970s, the labor movement and its allies waged a major campaign for legislation to
authorize penalties, but the resulting Labor Law Reform Bill of 1977-78 fell victim to a Senate
filibuster.85
The prohibition on Board deterrence has its origins in the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision
in Consolidated Edison Company v. NLRB.   There, the Court announced that the Board’s power86
to remedy unfair labor practices was “remedial, not punitive” and that it must be exercised as “a
means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation” – not the violations themselves –
and even then, only “where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the purposes of the Act.”  87
As in Mackay, the Court offered no explanation for its conclusion.  Chief Justice Hughes
forthrightly depicted it as a matter of opinion: “We think that [the statutory] authority to order
affirmative action does not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to
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inflict upon the employer any penalty it may choose because he is engaged in unfair labor
practices, even though the Board be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be
effectuated by such an order.”   88
The Court’s prohibition on deterrence finds scant support in the statutory language, which
authorizes the Board to order violators “to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and
to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of this Act.”   The very breadth of this language poses a problem for89
interpretation.  During the legislative hearings, one witness described it as “the provision that . . .
you may require them to do anything else that you want them to do that you think is in
accordance with the purpose of the act” and complained that it was “so vague and indefinite that,
judging by previous court decisions as to statutes being void for indefiniteness, I am not sure that
that section is specific enough.”   90
Given this indeterminacy, it was inevitable that some combination of Board and court
jurisprudence would put limits on the Board’s discretion; the question was what the limits would
be.   However, the Court’s choice to draw the line so as to prohibit any consideration of
deterrence conflicted with the statutory command to order action that would “effectuate the
policies of this Act,” all of which required the deterrence of unfair labor practices and not merely
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their remediation.  The Act proceeded from the theory that unfair labor practices triggered
strikes, and strikes burdened commerce.    Accordingly, section 1 of the Act clearly set forth91
both ex ante deterrent and ex post remedial policies, with ex ante deterrence coming first: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.92
 Why, then, did the Court confine the Board to ex post remedial objectives only?  To
answer this question, it will be necessary to consider the factual context of the Court’s statement. 
The Board had voided a number of collective bargaining agreements between the Consolidated
Edison Company and locals of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), an
affiliate of the American Federation of Labor.    The agreements had been negotiated in the93
midst of an organizing effort by the United Electrical Workers (UE), a CIO affiliate with a
reputation for militancy.   The Board found that the company had discriminated against the UE94
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and in favor of the IBEW.   According to the Board, the company had discharged six UE95
activists, engaged in industrial espionage against the UE, and provided material assistance to the
IBEW, including allowing its representatives to conduct business on company property during
working hours.  In the midst of these violations, the company recognized the IBEW locals as the
representatives for their members and commenced collective bargaining.  Within two months, the
company had concluded agreements with the IBEW locals, and those locals – which had enrolled
almost no members as of the grant of recognition – had signed up 30,000 of the company’s
38,000 employees.  The Board found that although the grant of recognition and the collective
bargaining agreement purported to cover IBEW members only, the Company’s policy had been
to negotiate with no other union and to extend the collective bargaining agreements to all
employees.   Hence, the contracts interfered with the workers’ free choice of representatives and96
had to be dissolved.
The Court disapproved this order for two reasons, both of which flowed from
constitutional concerns.  First, the order conflicted with the Court’s view of how best to fulfill
the constitutionally required function of facilitating interstate commerce.  As in Fansteel and
Mackay, the Board’s decision had stressed this goal to the exclusion of all others.  It described in
terrifying detail the “disastrous effect” that a strike against such a large provider of electric and
gas power would inflict on interstate commerce.  “Expressed concisely,” the Board warned, a
strike against Consolidated Edison “would not only affect the flow of the large quantities of coal
and oil which they receive in interstate commerce, but might be substantially equivalent to . . .
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simultaneous labor disputes” at all of the many important businesses that were dependent on the
company for electric energy or gas.   The Supreme Court heartily shared this concern, but found97
the Board’s solution perverse.  Taking the situation after the employer’s violations as a given,
Chief Justice Hughes argued that because the IBEW contracts prohibited strikes and provided for
the arbitration of disputes, they were “highly protective to interstate and foreign commerce.” 
Voiding such contracts, “even pending proceedings to ascertain by an election the wishes of the
majority of employees, would remove that salutary protection during the intervening period.” 
Thus, the contracts did not “affect commerce” in a way that would justify their abrogation.98
To the Court, then, the statutory policy in favor of “full freedom of association, self-
organization and designation of representatives” was contingent on a case-by-case judicial
determination as to whether vindicating those freedoms would facilitate interstate commerce –
taking as a given the results produced by the employer’s violations.  The contracts might not have
resulted from the free choice of the workers, but they did serve to protect commerce – the
“fundamental” purpose of the Act.    The employer won in court because its admittedly illegal99
discrimination was effective on the ground.  Once eighty per cent of the workers acquiesced in
the employer’s choice of union, it was highly unlikely that the violations would provoke a strike
or otherwise disrupt commerce.  The Board’s order to void the contracts would sacrifice the
“salutary protection” of the existing no-strike agreements in exchange for an exercise of worker
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freedom that might or might not produce new no-strike agreements.  Since Consolidated
Edison’s illegal discrimination had already worked to promote the “fundamental” purpose of the
Act, it would be silly to insist that peace be achieved – if at all – through the exercise of worker
freedom.
Second, the Court was concerned about the Board order’s intrusion on the parties’ liberty
of contract.  The IBEW’s lawyers had argued that by “absolutely and utterly” destroying
“existing contracts of labor organizations of long established standing,” the Board had
unconstitutionally taken the union’s property and impaired the obligation of contracts in violation
of the Fifth Amendment.   They further urged the Court to apply a clear statement rule that100
“[p]ower over and affecting the life, liberty, property and security of the citizen may not be taken
by inference, but only when the statute under which it is claimed demonstrates a plain intent to
grant it.”   Chief Justice Hughes duly prefaced his analysis of the Board’s statutory power to101
order “affirmative action” by noting that “the Act gives no express authority to the Board to
invalidate contracts with independent labor organizations.”   He then proceeded to hold that the102
IBEW’s members “had the right to choose the Brotherhood as their representative for collective
bargaining and to have contracts made as the result of that bargaining” and that the employer’s
unfair labor practices had not “deprived them of that right.”    Hughes purported to derive this103
right from the statute but, as Christopher Tomlins has pointed out, the ruling “was an important
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affirmation of the supremacy of the common law of contract.”   To Hughes, the employer’s104
suppression of the UE and support for the IBEW could not justify abrogating the IBEW contracts
as long as that union had any members “who joined voluntarily.”    The contract rights of those105
members and their union thus trumped the statutory right of the majority of workers to select
“representatives of their own choosing.”  
In dissent, Justice Reed argued that the Board must be empowered to “nullify advantages”
that the employer had gained by favoring the IBEW – a purpose that sounded more in deterrence
than in remedy.    To hold otherwise would be “to withdraw from the Board the specific106
authority granted by the Act to take affirmative action to protect the workers’ right of self-
organization.”   Where the Board had stressed solely the statutory purpose of protecting
commerce, Reed tried to build up the purpose of worker freedom.  He agreed with Chief Justice
Hughes that the “fundamental purpose” of the Act was to protect commerce, and that this
purpose was to be accomplished through collectively bargained contracts.  But to Reed, the
statute contemplated only contracts that had been negotiated by unions “created through the self-
organization of workers, free from interference, restraint or coercion of the employer.”  The right
of self-organization was “the basic privilege guaranteed by the Act,” and “[f]reedom from
employer domination flows from freedom in self-organization.”    107
Reed’s treatment of the statutory purposes undoubtedly tracked the intentions of the Act’s
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framers.  They had elevated the commerce-protecting purpose over all others not because they
believed it was more important, but because it was the centerpiece of their constitutional
strategy.    However, once this purpose was given priority in the statutory text, the Court could108
scarcely be blamed for taking the framers at their word.  Its twofold transgression lay, instead,
first in valuing the common law contract rights of the employer and the IBEW over the statutory
right of the employees to select their bargaining representative, and second in substituting its
own, ex post facto view of how to facilitate commerce in place of the statute’s ex ante goal of
eliminating the causes of industrial disputes.  In the years following Consolidated Edison, its
specific holding on the abrogation of contracts has been narrowed,  but its general prohibition109
against the deterrence of unfair labor practices lives on.
 
IV.  How Union Organizers Became Trespassers
Under the NLRA, the preferred method for establishing collective bargaining is the union
representation election.  To most Americans, the word “election” connotes a political contest
between two parties of equal legal status.  The party currently in office is prohibited from using
the power of government against the opposition party.  But union representation campaigns are
conducted on turf controlled by one of the competing parties, namely the employer.  Current law
allows employers to use this control to gain advantages unheard of in political elections.  The
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employer may command voters to attend anti-union rallies on pain of discharge.  It may require
voters to meet one-on-one with their supervisors to hear anti-union messages.  And it may adopt
and enforce a rule prohibiting everyone but itself from campaigning during work time.  110
Though daunting, these advantages could be at least partly offset if union organizers could enter
the workplace to respond.  But except in exceedingly rare circumstances, employers also enjoy
the right to exclude organizers from their property.
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court set forth the rule that section 7  leaves
intact the employer’s property right to exclude “nonemployee” union organizers from company
property “except in the rare case where ‘the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the
reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels.’”  111
The Board is “not permitted” to balance the employees’ statutory interest in receiving
information against the employer’s “right to control the use of his property.”  Instead, the
employer’s property rights automatically prevail unless “unique obstacles” prevent
communication, as in remote logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort hotels, where
the employees both live and work on the employer’s premises.    The employer need not plead112
any business interest to justify excluding organizers and may, in fact, restrict access for the
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precise purpose of preventing communication from reaching its employees.   Because113
employees typically scatter after work, the Lechmere rule poses a serious obstacle to
organizing.   Coupled with the rules permitting employers to stage captive audience speeches114
and to campaign on working time while barring workers from doing the same, it puts unions at a
gross disadvantage in communicating with voters. 
In contrast to Mackay and Consolidated Edison, the Lechmere opinion does cite authority
and provide reasoning in support of its rule.  At issue was the validity of the Board’s standard,
announced in Jean Country,  requiring employers to grant access to union organizers in certain115
circumstances.  Under the rule of Chevron Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,  the116
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Board’s standard was entitled to broad deference unless the Court could find contrary “clear
meaning” in the statute.    Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas found that “clear meaning” in117
section 7 of the Act, which guarantees the right of self-organization only to “employees.”    He118
pointed to the “critical distinction between the organizing activities of employees (to whom §  7
guarantees the right of self-organization) and nonemployees (to whom §  7 applies only
derivatively).”   By itself, this left open the question why union organizers, who are119
“employees” of the union and who are aligned with other employees in collective bargaining, are
not “employees” under section 7.   The obvious place to look for an answer to this question
would be the statutory definition of the term “employee,” which is contained in section 2(3) of
the Act.
But Justice Thomas chose to conduct his search for the “statute’s clear meaning” without
so much as a glance at the relevant portion of the statute itself.  Why this omission?  Section 2(3)
states that “[t]he term employee . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed . . . by any . . .
person who is not an employer as herein defined.”   Justice Thomas could have argued that full-120
time union organizers are excluded from this definition because they are employed by labor
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organizations, which are not statutory employers except when they are “acting as” employers.  121
In the union organizing setting, the union is certainly not acting as an employer.  However, there
is legislative history contrary to this argument.  Philip Levy, one of the statute’s drafters, 
proposed language specifying that union organizers are statutory “employees,” but it was not
included “apparently because it was thought not to be necessary.”   Why would Levy’s122
language be unnecessary?  Perhaps because it was clear to all concerned that the partial exclusion
of labor organizations from the definition of “employer” provided no reason at all to hold that
union organizers – who are clearly statutory employees in relation to their own employers –
should lose that status when performing their function of organizing workers.  Labor
organizations were partially excluded from the definition of  “employer” so that they could not be
charged with employer unfair labor practices under then-section 8(3), now section (8)(a)(3). 
“Otherwise the provisions of the bill which prevent employers from participating in the
organizational activities of workers would extend to labor unions as well, and thus would deprive
unions of one of their normal functions.”   In light of this purpose, it would be ironic indeed to123
seize on the definition of “employer” to prevent union organizers from “participating in the
organizational activities of workers.”
Whatever the reason, Justice Thomas chose to rely not on the statute, but on the Court’s
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pre-Chevron decision in NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox Co.    In Babcock, the Court had124
overturned a series of Board orders requiring employers to permit union organizers on their
property.  The Board had erred, the Court held, by “fail[ing] to make a distinction between rules
of law applicable to employees and those applicable to nonemployees.”    Unfortunately for125
Justice Thomas’ rationale, however, the terms “nonemployee” and “employee” as used by the
Babcock Court had nothing whatever to do with the statutory term “employees” contained in
section 7, and thus could not meet the Chevron requirement of  “clear meaning” in the statute.  126
As of 1956, when Babcock was decided, the terms “nonemployee” and “employee” had an
established usage in cases involving union organizer access to employer property.  Courts used
the term “nonemployee” in contradistinction not to a statutory “employee” entitled to section 7
rights, but to an employee who was employed by the particular employer and therefore rightfully
on the property.    Not only was this usage developed without any reference to the statutory127
term “employee,” but it directly conflicted with the statutory definition.  “The term ‘employee’,”
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declares the statute, “shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer.”    But if128
the statute did not distinguish between employees and nonemployees of a particular employer,
the common law of trespass did.  As the Board read Babcock, the distinction hinged on the fact
“that the nonemployees in Babcock & Wilcox sought to trespass on the employer’s property,
whereas the employees” did not.    Accordingly, the Board held that employers enjoyed the129
property right under Babcock to exclude even their own off-duty employees – clearly statutory
employees entitled to section 7 rights – without pleading any business reason.    In short,130
Babcock’s distinction between nonemployees and employees rested not on the statute but on the
common law of trespass, raising once again the question of how state common-law rights could
trump federal statutory rights.131
Unlike the opinions in Mackay and Consolidated Edison, the Babcock opinion addressed
this issue directly.  “Organization rights are granted to workers, by the same authority, the
National Government, that preserves property rights,” declared the Court.   “Accommodation
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between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other.”   Of course, as any first-year law student can testify, property rights132
are creatures of state law, not the “National Government.”  National involvement in property law
can, however, be found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, which prohibit national and state government from depriving a person of property
without due process of law or from taking property “without just compensation.”    This was133
the approach urged by the company’s lawyers,  and it is the only apparent explanation of the134
Babcock Court’s reference to the “National Government,” which, in turn, is the only rationale for
the rule of Lechmere.
Commenting on Babcock, Professor Atleson remarked that, in light of the opinion’s
failure to cite the statutory definition of “employee,” the Supreme Court evidently “feels free to
apply common-law property notions without any felt need to respond to either the language of
the Act or its history.”    That the Lechmere Court subsequently managed to find “clear135
meaning” in the statute sufficient to evade Chevron – still without once citing the governing
statutory definition – attests to the arrogance of this judicial liberty.   Aside from the reference to
the national government in Babcock, and an occasional explicit invocation of the Constitution by
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dissenting Justices or lower courts,  judges have left the trumping power of property rights136
unexplained and unexamined.   
          V.  How Employers Won the Exclusive Right to Class Solidarity
Class solidarity has not fared well in American courts.  Under the common law, judges
held that strikes were lawful only if the strikers were motivated by the prospect of immediate
economic gain for themselves; broader or more attenuated motives were condemned as
“malicious.”   When statutes began to displace the common law, courts carried this approach137
over into their statutory interpretations.  Absent a strong showing of immediate worker self-
interest, collective action falls outside the NLRA’s protection for “concerted activities for mutual
aid or protection.”   And the Supreme Court has construed the Act’s secondary boycott ban138
broadly to include political boycotts on the ground that it is “more rather than less objectionable”
for a union to pursue non-traditional objectives instead of higher wages and better working
conditions for its own members.139
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But in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Company, the Court carved
out a limited but increasingly important exception for employer class solidarity.  Reversing its
usual preference for narrowly self-interested activity, the Court ruled that an employer may close
a facility to punish its employees for choosing union representation provided that the employer is
not motivated by economic self-interest.   Management had threatened to close a textile mill140
that was the economic mainstay of a small southern town if the workers voted to be represented
by the Textile Workers Union.   Nevertheless, the union won the election by a small margin. 141
Six days later, the company’s board of directors voted to close the plant and terminate all 500
employees.   Supervisors told the workers that the shutdown was because of the union vote, and142
that the workers would be blacklisted in their search for jobs.   Eighty-three per cent of the143
workers then signed a petition renouncing the union, but the top management official declared
that “[a]s long as there are seventeen percent of the hard core crowd here, I refuse to run the
mill.”144
The NLRB ordered Darlington to pay the workers wages from the time of termination up
to the time that they found substantially equivalent employment, and to rehire them “in the event
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Darlington, at some time, recommences operations.”   In addition, the Board found that145
Darlington was controlled by a parent company, the Deering-Milliken corporation, and that
Deering-Milliken could be held responsible for Darlington’s unfair labor practices.   The Board146
ordered Deering-Milliken to assume liability for the back pay award and to place the terminated
employees on a preferential hiring list for openings at its other mills.    The Board did not order147
either Darlington or Deering-Milliken to reopen the plant. 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7.”   It is difficult to imagine a more dramatic and effective means of coercing employees in the
exercise of section 7 rights than to punish them by closing their workplace altogether.  The facts
of Darlington provide a graphic illustration.  Within weeks of the closing, a majority of the union
voters had renounced their support for the union in a desperate attempt to recover their jobs.   148
But in Darlington, the Supreme Court  announced a new rule that “some employer
decisions are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative” that they cannot violate section
8(a)(1) no matter how great their impact on section 7 rights, unless they also violate section
8(a)(3), which requires a showing of anti-union discrimination.   Furthermore, proof of149
management’s anti-union hostility – of which there was plenty in Darlington – is not enough to
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establish discrimination.  The employer may intentionally destroy the union and punish the
workers for exercising their statutory rights unless the Board can prove that these actions were
undertaken for the specific purpose of obtaining future economic benefits from the employer’s
remaining employees.   Applying these principles, the Court held that a corporation has an150
“absolute right” to terminate its employees and go out of business altogether regardless of the
impact on section 7 rights – there being no remaining employees from whom to obtain future
benefits.    Further, a corporation may close a part of its business in retaliation for the exercise151
of section 7 rights unless the NLRB can prove that the closing had the purpose of chilling
unionism among the corporation’s remaining employees.    152
  
Darlington has exerted an increasingly devastating impact on unions as technological
advances have smoothed the way for corporations to move their operations.    As we have seen,153
companies are permitted to shut down facilities for retaliatory purposes without any regard for
the rights of employees at the closed facilities; the only employees who count are those at the
company’s other, still-operating facilities.  But if those operating facilities are not in the United
States, then their employees are not covered by the Act, and the shutdown could not have been
for the purpose of chilling their non-existent section 7 rights.  “By focusing on the chilling effect
on any remaining domestic employees, instead of on the discrimination practiced against those
who lost their jobs,” observes Terry Collingsworth, “the Court . . . has immunized multinational
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runaways.”154
The Darlington Court’s failure to consider the coercive impact of the closing on the
terminated workers and their town has sparked vigorous criticism over the years.  Professor
Clyde Summers set the tone early on:
The essence of the Court’s logic is that discharge for supporting the union is not itself an
unfair labor practice, that it is no wrong as to the ones discharged, and that the law is not
concerned with their injury. Discrimination against them is an evil only when it
intimidates others; any remedy given them is only to make others feel secure. This is to
see in the execution of hostages nothing more than an intimidation of the living; it is to
make murder a crime only when the killer’s purpose is to instill fear.155
Why did the Court turn a blind eye to the terminated workers?  As to Darlington, the
Court asserted that “so far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the absolute
right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases.”    To explain this assertion, the156
Court contrasted the retaliatory plant closing with the (concededly illegal) retaliatory lockout. 
Whereas an employer might use a lockout to win economic concessions from workers, 
a complete liquidation of a business yields no such future benefit for the employer, if the
termination is bona fide.  It may be motivated more by spite against the union than by
business reasons, but it is not the type of discrimination which is prohibited by the Act. 
The personal satisfaction that such an employer may derive from standing on his beliefs
and the mere possibility that other employers will follow his example are surely too
remote to be considered dangers at which the labor statutes were aimed.  Although
employees may be prohibited from engaging in a strike under certain conditions, no one
would consider it a violation of the Act for the same employees to quit their employment
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en masse, even if motivated by a desire to ruin the employer.  The very permanence of
such action would negate any future economic benefit to the employees.  The employer’s
right to go out of business is no different.157
At first glance, this passage is simply nonsensical.  The reason why no one would
consider it a violation of the Act for employees to quit for the purpose of ruining an employer is
that the Act does not even purport to prohibit employees from attempting to ruin employers; it
prohibits labor organizations or their agents from restraining or coercing employers in the
selection of their representatives for purposes of collective bargaining.   If the workers quit158
permanently, then there would no longer be anything for the employer representatives – however
selected – to bargain about.  By contrast, the statute fits the facts of Darlington like a glove; it
bars employers from coercing employees in the exercise of section 7 rights or discriminating
against them based on union membership – precisely what happened.
On closer examination, the statement only becomes more mysterious.  The notion that an
exercise of power, otherwise illegal, is exempted from the Act because it is not motivated by the
prospect of economic gain turns the normal rule on its head.   As we have seen, courts have long
held that strikes become more – not less – vulnerable to legal suppression when they are
motivated by considerations other than economic gain.  This principle is grounded on the idea
that because a strike involves the deliberate infliction of economic damage, it is justifiable only if
the strikers themselves have an observable interest at stake.   Yet, under Darlington, employers159
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enjoy the privilege of dealing catastrophic economic damage to entire working class communities
not only despite their lack of any observable economic interest, but because they have no such
interest and may – in fact – be “motivated . . . by spite against the union.”  Thus, Darlington
stands the old common-law malice test exactly on its head; for employers, malicious motivation
can be a ticket to legal immunity.
But in fact, of course, there is much more to retaliatory shutdowns than mere spite or
malice.  Like sympathy strikes and secondary strikes, they produce valuable benefits – benefits
that are reaped not directly by the perpetrator, but by fellow members of the perpetrator’s class. 
The shutdown operates like a public flogging, intimidating not only the victims themselves, but
also every worker who hears of their plight.  Darlington excludes this effect from consideration
unless the employer stands to gain individually from the intimidation of its own remaining
employees.  Employers that act out of class solidarity, helping to produce a cowed and compliant
workforce for their fellow employers, are privileged to commit what would otherwise be
statutory violations.
How, then, can Darlington be explained?    Without specifically mentioning the
Constitution, the Court applied the clear statement rule: “A proposition that a single businessman
cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation
that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or
unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act.”   At the equivalent160
juncture in the opinion below, the Court of Appeals made the constitutional connection explicit. 
“A statute authorizing an order forcing the continued pursuit of operations in these
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remanded, 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
  79 Cong. Rec. 7673, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 34, at 2394 (Sen.162
Walsh) (“[T]here are some fundamental rights an employer has, just as there are rights an
employee has.  No one can compel an employer to keep his factory open”); 79 Cong. Rec. 9682,
reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 34, at 3110 (Rep. Griswold) (“There is nothing in
the bill to keep an operator from closing his plant.  There is nothing in the bill that says you shall
reach an agreement–nothing of that sort”).
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circumstances,” opined the court, “would be of doubtful validity.”161
The Supreme Court’s reference to “a single businessman” choosing to go out of business
invokes the rights both of property and contract.  This problem was mentioned on the floor of
Congress, where proponents of the NLRA assured opponents that the bill would not prevent an
operator from closing “his” plant.    Like our other four “of course” statements, then,162
Darlington can be explained as a belated echo of Lochner-era economic due process.  
This time, however, economic due process is not the only possible explanation.  After all,
Darlington and Deering-Milliken were both corporations – not “single” businessmen.  Moreover,
the Board did not order anyone to remain in business; it required only that the corporations
compensate employees who were terminated for retaliatory reasons.  The Supreme Court did not
comment on this point; it simply assumed that the Board’s ruling was equivalent to the
“proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to.”  But
obviously the government can impose some burdens on going out of business, for example taxes
on the sale of assets.  It is not at all clear why the employer’s liberty interest requires not only that
it should be allowed to go out of business for retaliatory reasons, but also that it be freed from
any obligation to factor in the cost of compensating terminated employees for the loss of their
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  See Getman, Section 8(a)(3), supra note 155, at 754 (observing that “the conclusion163
that an employer should not be forced to stay in business against his will does not require the
further conclusion that his conduct in closing down is outside the scope of the Act”).
  Summers, supra note 155, at 67.164
  380 U.S. at 272.165
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statutory right to organize.  163
How then, do we make sense of Darlington?  Is the decision “inherently incredible,”  as164
an exasperated Clyde Summers concluded years ago?  Yes, if we read it as a statutory opinion;
certainly it makes no sense to exempt employer retaliation merely because it is motivated not by
economic gain but by, as the Court put it, the “personal satisfaction that . . . an employer may
derive from standing on his beliefs and the . . . possibility that other employers will follow his
example.”   In either case, as Summers pointed out, the effect on the terminated employees is165
the same.  Even as a matter of Lochner-style economic due process, it seems odd – if not
“inherently incredible” – that the Court would single out closings motivated by “spite” for special
protection.  But perhaps we could make some sense of Darlington by reading it as a modern
constitutional decision.  In the constitutional law of the post-New Deal era, as in Darlington,
non-economic motivation weighs in favor of legal protection.  For example, political speech
occupies a higher position on the “hierarchy of first amendment values” than commercial
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  Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); see, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.166
Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 506-09 (explaining that a corporation’s efforts to influence a
private standard-setting organization were not entitled to full first amendment protection because
the company was economically motivated); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
67 (1983) (holding that pamphlets combining product descriptions with commentary on the
desirability of contraceptives in general were commercial speech in part because of the
company’s “economic motivation” for selling them).
  Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-12 (1982) (holding 167
that a “politically motivated” civil rights boycott was protected under the first amendment); with
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA), 493 U.S. 411, 427 (1990) (holding that a
boycott by court-appointed defense lawyers could be constitutionally prohibited in part because
the lawyers’ “immediate objective was to increase the price that they would be paid for their
services”).
  International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1982).168
For criticism of the Court’s treatment of political and solidaristic labor protest, see Atleson,
supra note 1, at 68-74; Fischl, supra note 138, at 865; Jack Getman, Labor Law and Free
Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 Md. L. Rev. 4, 17-18 (1984); Hyde, supra
note 139; Tom Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, our First
Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 Wisc. L. Rev. 149, 168-70; Gary
Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 807, 826-30 (1993); James G. Pope,
The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 Hast.
Const’l L.Q. 189, 189-91, 225-27 (1984); see also Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor
Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 Va. L. Rev.  685 (1985) (presenting a carefully crafted effort to
rationalize and harmonize the leading cases in a way that would provide a far greater degree of
49
speech,  and politically-motivated boycotts higher than economically-motivated boycotts.   166 167
Put this together with the established – albeit bitterly criticized – principle that corporations are
entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as natural persons, and we have a
constitutional explanation for Darlington’s right of corporations to stand on their beliefs and
punish workers for unionizing.   On this view, the anomaly in the law lies not in Darlington
itself, but in the Court’s failure to apply the same rule to unions that refuse to handle goods for
solidaristic or political reasons.  If non-economic motivation weighs against the suppression of
employer conduct, then why should the same motivation make union conduct “more rather than
less objectionable” and thus subject to greater restriction?168
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protection for political protest by labor than has been implemented either by courts or the Board).
  J. Denson Smith, From Nose-Thumbing to Sabotage, 1 La. L. Rev. 577, 577 (1939). 169
  Id. at 580.170
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VI.  Conclusion: The Perfect Crime
This essay has examined five important labor law doctrines that were originally
announced as “of course” propositions.  In each case, the proposition in question deployed an
employer right grounded in state common law as a trump over a labor right grounded in federal
statutory law – thus reversing the normal hierarchy of laws.  And in each case, it turned out that
what the Supreme Court treated as a matter “of course,” had been justified by lawyers and lower
court judges in constitutional terms.   State common law rights of property and contract were
elevated above federal statutory rights of self-organization and collective action through the
constitutional doctrine of economic due process. 
This summary leaves us with some important questions.  First, if these decisions are best
explained in terms of constitutional law, then why didn’t the Supreme Court just come out and
say so?   The answer may be found in the Court’s experience with its Fansteel opinion, the only
one of the five to mention the Constitution directly.  Although the opinion as a whole drew
mixed reactions, the constitutional language in particular drew harsh criticism.   Professor J.
Denson Smith charged that Fansteel had revived the discredited economic due process decisions
of Coppage v. Kansas and Adair v. United States.    Once again, he explained, the due process169
clause had been applied to the employer-employee relationship so as “to protect the general
control of the former over the latter,” and this time “even during a period of industrial strife, and
notwithstanding that the employer had been guilty of unfair labor practices under the Act.”  170
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art3
  See, e.g., Frank Thomas Miller, Jr., Sit-Down Strikes--Reinstatement of Employees171
Under the Wagner Act, 17 N. Car. L.Rev. 438, 439 (1939); Note, Power of the National Labor
Relations Board to Order Reinstatement of Sit-Down Strikers, 27 Cal. L.Rev. 470, 473 (1939).
  Arthur Krock, Implications in the dissents of Reed and Black, New York Times,172
March 1, 1939, at 20.
  This phenomenon followed the pattern modeled by Jack Balkin as “the crystalline173
structure of law.”  Balkin shows how a dominant principle may triumph over a competing
counterprinciple in a central case, yet remain vulnerable to the suppressed counterprinciple in
more marginal cases.  J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 Rutgers L.
Rev. 1 (1986). 
  Befort, supra note 53, at 440-41 (recounting that employers did not begin to make174
extensive use of the permanent replacement rule until after 1981, when President Ronald Reagan
used the tactic to defeat the air traffic controllers’ strike).  On the recent impact of Mackay, see
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Others agreed.   On the assumption that Fansteel partook of the pre-New Deal mentality, New171
York Times columnist Arthur Krock predicted that the dissenters’ position -- which was
“eloquent of New Deal reasoning” in emphasizing the Board’s statutory power to remedy unfair
labor practices -- would eventually prevail.    The reaction to Fansteel’s constitutional language172
signaled that if the Court were to persist in openly resurrecting economic due process in labor
law, it would do so at a heavy cost in legitimacy.    
So the Justices hid the economic due process in “of course” statements.  And, just as
importantly, they pushed it away from what were then the central issues and to the margins – out
of the political and professional spotlights.    Many of the “of course” statements were barely173
noticed at the time.  It is only over the past several decades, as their impact has been magnified
by social and economic change, that they have emerged as central issues.  Taken together, they
may account for a substantial proportion of the decline in the American labor movement.  The
permanent replacement rule of Mackay, ignored at the time and rarely utilized until the 1980s,
now operates to prevent workers from exercising their right to strike for better conditions.   The174
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supra notes 51-54 & accompanying text.  At the time of the decision, unionists and their legal
allies focused on the positive aspects of the case, not even bothering to mention the permanent
replacement issue.  See, e.g., Supreme Court’s O.K. Of NLRB In Mackay Case Blow To Tories,
Union News Service (CIO), May 20, 1938, at 1.
   On the impact of the no-deterrence rule today, see supra notes 82-85 and175
accompanying text.  Like Mackay, Consolidated Edison raised a number of issues, and the Board
prevailed on all except one.  For contemporary reports, see, e.g., Ward P. Allen, Power of
National Labor Relations Board to Invalidate Contract Between Employer and Bona Fide
Union, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 660, 663 (1939); Note, Abrogation of Contracts Signed During
Pendency of NLRB Proceedings, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 695, 695-96 (1939).  
  On the impact of Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere, see supra notes 110, 114, and176
accompanying text. 
  On the effects of Darlington today, see supra notes 153-54, and accompanying text. 177
While the Darlington decision was heavily criticized at the time, nobody contested the Supreme
Court’s view that there was nothing more than a “mere possibility” that other employers would
follow Darlington’s lead.  Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Company, 380
U.S. at 272.
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no-deterrence rule of Consolidated Edison, also little noted at the time, now ensures that even
when employers are caught red-handed, they stand to gain financially from violating workers’
rights.   The employer’s right to exclude union organizers under Babcock & Wilcox and175
Lechmere poses an increasingly formidable barrier to union-worker communication as more and
more jobs are located in self-contained facilities like malls, shopping centers, industrial parks and
office parks.    Finally, the employer’s right – announced in Darlington – to punish workers for176
unionizing by closing their place of employment out of “spite,” which was considered at the time
unlikely to be exercised very often, now causes serious problems due to the increasingly global
scope of economic activity.  177
This brings us to the question of legitimacy.  Had the Court openly grounded these rulings
in the Constitution, it is highly unlikely that they would remain good law today.  For half a
century, the Court has disavowed economic due process.  Despite academic efforts to revive
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art3
  On the continuing vitality of Lochner as a negative precedent, see, e.g., United States178
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605 (1995) (Scalia, J. concurring) (denying that the majority was
reviving Lochner); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, 527 U.S. 666, 690-691 (1999) (same).  On the failure of efforts to rehabilitate Lochner,
see Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 Law  & Soc. Inquiry 221, 222, 243
(1999).
  See Estlund, Ossification, supra note 52, at 1561.179
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Lochner, the decision continues to operate as a negative precedent, and the charge of
Lochnerizing rarely fails to elicit strong denials.   But by couching its rulings as matters of178
statutory construction, the Court has entrenched them against change.  As Professor Cynthia
Estlund recently observed, labor law has ossified.  No matter how devoid of statutory reasoning
or how destructive of the statute’s purposes in light of changed conditions, old Supreme Court
constructions of the statute are accorded a kind of super-stare decisis.    Not only are the179
corpses in labor law buried in “of course” statements, then, but they are buried deeply, beyond
the reach of judicial or administrative change.  Through misdirection, the Court has pulled off the
perfect crime.
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